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a b s t r a c t
We present a case-series comparison of patients with cross-modal semantic impairments consequent on
either (a) bilateral anterior temporal lobe atrophy in semantic dementia (SD) or (b) left-hemisphere
fronto-parietal and/or posterior temporal stroke in semantic aphasia (SA). Both groups were assessed on
a new test battery designed to measure how performance is influenced by concept familiarity, typicality
and specificity. In line with previous findings, performance in SD was strongly modulated by all of these
factors, with better performance for more familiar items (regardless of typicality), for more typical items
(regardless of familiarity) and for tasks that did not require very specific classification, consistent with
the gradual degradation of conceptual knowledge in SD. The SA group showed significant impairments
on all tasks but their sensitivity to familiarity, typicality and specificity was more variable and governed
by task-specific effects of these factors on controlled semantic processing. The results are discussed with
reference to theories about the complementary roles of representation and manipulation of semantic
knowledge.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The ease with which we call to mind information about the
items encountered in daily life varies with several factors laid bare
by cognitive psychology over the last few decades. The speed and
accuracy with which an item is named or categorized, or its at-
tributes inferred or verified, can depend upon properties of the
item, such as its overall familiarity (Smith, 1967) and its proto-
typicality (Rosch et al., 1976b), and upon demands of the task, such
as the specificity which the item must be classified (Rosch et al.,
1976a), the “prepotency” or automaticity of the response to be
generated (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977), and the degree to which
the respondent must adjudicate amongst many potentially correct
responses (Thompson-Schill et al., 1999). Such phenomena have
long been a focus of study in healthy cognition because they shed
light on the representations and processes that underlie human
conceptual knowledge, and a variety of different models have been
proposed to explain these different effects in healthy adults
(Ashby and Maddox, 1993; Logan, 1980; Nosofsky, 1986; Shiffrin
and Steyvers, 1997).
Neuropsychological studies of such effects also provide com-
pelling evidence toward the development of semantic models,
especially when they document patterns that cannot be antici-
pated from healthy behavior alone. For example, where healthy
adults are faster and more accurate to categorize visually-pre-
sented items at the basic level (e.g. “bird”) than at a more general
level (e.g. “animal”), patients with semantic dementia (SD)—a
progressive dementing illness that gradually erodes semantic
knowledge—show the reverse pattern (Rogers and Patterson,
2007). As a contrastive example, patients with SD, like healthy
controls, are better at naming high-familiarity than low-familiarity
items (Warrington, 1975; Woollams et al., 2008), but patients with
cross modal semantic impairments following left-hemisphere
stroke can show either no familiarity effect or greatly reduced
effects in the same tasks (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006). Such
phenomena demonstrate that impaired semantic abilities are not
simply slower and less accurate mirrors of healthy abilities. Instead
the factors that influence healthy cognition can exert qualitatively
different effects in different varieties of disordered behavior. The




0028-3932/& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
n Corresponding author at: 524 WJ Brogden Hall, Department of Psychology,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, United States.
Fax: þ1 608 262 4279.
E-mail address: ttrogers@wisc.edu (T.T. Rogers).
Neuropsychologia 76 (2015) 220–239
contrasting patterns provide evidence important for constraining
theories about the representations and processes that support
healthy semantic cognition.
Neuropsychological work in this vein has mainly focused on
one or two factors taken individually within a particular patient
group. Only a handful of studies have directly compared effects
across different patient groups (e.g., Corbett et al., 2009b; Jefferies
and Lambon Ralph, 2006; Libon et al., 2013; Ogar et al., 2011), and
to our knowledge, no study has simultaneously studied the joint
influence of multiple factors across multiple tasks in different
groups. Yet there are reasons for pursuing such large-scale multi-
faceted investigation. First, the interesting factors are often con-
founded in natural concepts. Items judged to be atypical of their
category, for instance, also tend to be less familiar, so it is difficult
to know how these factors individually contribute to impaired
behavior (McRae et al., 2005). Second, the different factors interact
with one another even in healthy cognition. For instance, while
typical items are classified more rapidly at the basic level than at
more specific levels, the reverse is true for atypical items (Jolicoeur
et al., 1984); and while people are faster to classify more familiar
items when typicality is controlled, they can be faster to classify
unfamiliar but typical items than highly familiar but atypical items
(Whittlesea, 2002). To understand how the different factors in-
fluence impaired semantic cognition, they must be under si-
multaneous control. Third, the comparison of such effects across
patient groups is necessary to understand whether the factors of
interest exert the same influences under any form of semantic
impairment, or whether different effects are observed for different
semantic syndromes. To the extent that differences across syn-
dromes are observed, these may provide clues about the nature of
the deficits in the associated syndromes and about the operation
of the healthy system.
The current paper provides the first case-series comparison of
the effects of familiarity, typicality and specificity in two different
semantic syndromes, across four commonly-used tasks that also
vary in other respects relevant to understanding semantic im-
pairment. The patient groups differ in their aetiology and lesion
sites, and their impairments are posited to stem from disruption to
fundamentally different underlying cognitive processes (Jefferies
and Lambon Ralph, 2006). Thus a central aim of the work, in ad-
dition to simply characterizing how familiarity, typicality, and
specificity influence disordered behavior across syndromes and
tasks, is to assess whether the hypothesized differences between
groups can help to explain when and why the two groups exhibit
similar or different patterns of behavior. In the remainder of this
section, therefore, we briefly describe the patient groups and
working hypotheses about the nature of each disorder developed
in prior work.
1.1. Semantic dementia, semantic aphasia and the controlled se-
mantic cognition (CSC) framework
Our analyses focus on two varieties of semantic impairment
stemming from different aetiologies. The first is semantic de-
mentia (SD), a neurodegenerative disorder also known as the
temporal-lobe variant of fronto-temporal dementia (Hodges et al.,
1992; Snowden et al., 1989). SD is invariably associated with
atrophy and hypometabolism centered on the ventral region of the
anterior temporal lobes, bilaterally (Acosta-Cabronero et al., 2011).
The semantic impairment in SD affects knowledge of all kinds of
concepts, across all modalities of testing, and is relatively pure:
other aspects of cognition, including perception and attention,
episodic and working memory, executive function, reasoning and
problem solving, and grammatical and phonological aspects of
language, remain normal or near normal until late in the disease
(Hodges and Patterson, 2007; Snowden et al., 2001). Despite its
global nature, the deterioration of conceptual knowledge observed
in SD is structured in three respects: (i) patients perform better for
more frequent or familiar items than for less frequent/familiar
items (e.g., Funnell, 1995; Lambon Ralph et al., 1998; Warrington,
1975); (ii) patients often retain at least modest knowledge of more
prototypical items (e.g., horse) and properties (e.g., a camel has a
mouth) in contrast to very degraded information about less pro-
totypical items (e.g., buffalo) and properties (e.g., a camel has a
hump) (Rogers et al., 2004b; Woollams et al., 2008); and (iii) more
specific names and concepts (e.g., a particular bird is a “robin”) are
more vulnerable than more general names and concepts (e.g., the
same object is also a “bird” or an “animal”) (Rogers et al., 2004a;
Warrington, 1975).
The second group consists of patients who show multi-modal
semantic impairments following left-hemisphere stroke affecting
broad areas of inferior frontal and/or temporoparietal cortex.
Jefferies and Lambon Ralph (2006), following Head (1926), have
labeled this pattern semantic aphasia (SA). The central diagnostic
criteria for SA include verbal and nonverbal comprehension im-
pairments (as assessed, for example, by the word and picture
versions of the Camel and Cactus Test) following left hemisphere
stroke.
Several studies have now shown that patients with SA differ
qualitatively from those with SD in several respects: (i) While non-
verbal reasoning and executive functioning are preserved in SD,
semantic impairments in SA correlate with the degree of executive
dysfunction (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006). (ii) Itemwise
consistency for the same concept across different tests is generally
high in SD but much more variable in SA (Corbett et al., 2009a;
Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006). (iii) Across both verbal and
nonverbal tasks, patients with SA benefit significantly from ap-
propriate cueing and are disrupted by miscues (Corbett et al.,
2011; Jefferies et al., 2008), whereas patients with SD are sub-
stantially less influenced by cueing. (iv) Whilst word frequency/
concept familiarity strongly influences naming and comprehen-
sion in SD, patients with SA can show reduced or null effects of
frequency/familiarity in naming (Hoffman et al., 2011; Jefferies and
Lambon Ralph, 2006) and in some circumstances appear to show
better comprehension of lower-frequency items (Almaghyuli et al.,
2012). (v) While both groups produce semantic errors in naming,
patients with SA produce many more associative errors (e.g.,
SQUIRREL- “nuts”) and fewer “no response” errors compared to
patients with SD (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006). (vi) Patients
with SA are significantly more impaired when the task requires
the participant to (a) match concepts that are only weakly related,
(b) resolve conceptual ambiguity, or (c) correctly select a weak
target from amongst several strongly competing distractors (Cor-
bett et al., 2011; Noonan et al., 2010). Though these phenomena
have been less well-studied in SD, Jefferies and Lambon Ralph
(2006) found that task difficulty better predicted comprehension
measures in SA than in SD.
To help understand the differences between patient groups, we
here articulate a framework that builds on prior work both by our
group (Jefferies, 2013; Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006; Lambon
Ralph, 2014; Patterson et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 2004a) and by
others (Badre et al., 2005; Botvinick and Cohen, 2014; Duncan,
2010; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Wagner et al., 2001) that we will
refer to as controlled semantic cognition (CSC). In common with
many other theories, the CSC framework proposes that semantic
knowledge involves the interactive activation of representations
distributed throughout cortex that encode sensory, motor, linguistic
and affective information (Martin and Chao, 2001; Meteyard et al.,
2012; Pulvermüller, 2013). For instance, the concept “robin” draws
on representations of this object's shape, color, texture, visual mo-
tion, sound and verbal associations. To this widespread general
view the CSC framework adds two key components.
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First, interactions amongst the various surface representations
(“spokes”) are mediated by a domain-general cross-modal hub
situated bilaterally in the anterior temporal cortex (Guo et al.,
2013; Lambon Ralph, 2014; Mayberry et al., 2010; Patterson et al.,
2007; Rogers et al., 2004a). While other pathways may also con-
nect the various representations, the hub is critically important to
semantic cognition because it allows the system to both learn and
exploit conceptual similarity structure that is not directly captured
by any single surface modality. Thus, for instance, we can discern
that a stork and robin are similar kinds of things despite being
quite different in shape, size, color, name and movement. This
ability is fundamentally important for the generalization of ac-
quired knowledge to novel items and situations, and the ATL
supports such generalization by representing conceptually related
items with similar patterns of neural activity (Rogers et al., 2004a).
Second, the CSC proposes that the “hub-and-spoke” network
alone is insufficient to support successful semantic cognition in
many situations. The network encodes a vast array of different
features and associations, only a subset of which will be relevant in
a given task context. To ensure that the “right” information comes
to mind in a given situation, the flow of activation in the network
is constrained by a representation of the current task context or
goals (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006; Rogers and McClelland,
2004; Wagner et al., 2001). In this way the CSC framework draws
upon the extensive literature on cognitive control, and in parti-
cular the “guided activation” approach to control (Botvinick and
Cohen, 2014). In keeping with this literature, the CSC framework
proposes that the task/goal representations are encoded within
fronto-parietal networks, and that these representations help to
generate task-appropriate responses by facilitating or “potentiat-
ing” interactions among sub-components of the hub-and-spokes
network. Computational models consistent with this proposal
have been described by Rogers and McClelland (2004), who
showed how the central idea sheds light on a variety of phe-
nomena in healthy cognition and cognitive development, and
by Dilkina et al. (2008), who showed how variability across dif-
ferent semantic tasks in SD might arise within a system in which
the flow of activation is constrained by representations of the
current task.
1.2. Causes of semantic impairment in the CSC framework
In SD, semantic impairment is proposed to arise from neuro-
degeneration in the ATL hub, so that the pattern generated over
the hub part of the semantic network in response to any given
stimulus becomes increasingly distorted and the strength of in-
teraction between the hub and “spoke” representations becomes
increasingly muted (Guo et al., 2013; Lambon Ralph et al., 2007). In
SA, the semantic impairment is held to arise from damage to the
control system that shapes the flow of activation through the hub-
and-spokes network, so that processing within the semantic net-
work becomes pathologically noisy as the balance of activation
and inhibition is thrown off-kilter—an effect that will be stronger
for tasks or items that require a greater degree of control.
This proposal predicts certain similarities between the two
syndromes. Simulations with neural network models of semantics
have shown that a central proposed cause of dysfunction in each
disorder—the distortion of hub representations in SD, and the
pathologically noisy processing in SA—will produce similar effects:
a loss of, or difficulty in activating, knowledge about properties
that individuate semantic neighbors that is especially pronounced
for lower-familiarity items (Rogers and McClelland, 2004; Rogers
et al., 2004a, 2004b; Lambon Ralph et al., 2007). Individuating
properties are especially vulnerable because, to retrieve them, the
semantic representation at the hub must be specified very pre-
cisely. If the hub representation is distorted, either via direct hub
damage or from noisy processing caused by degraded control, the
item will be confused with its semantic neighbors and the ability
to correctly activate its individuating properties will diminish. The
effect is especially pronounced for lower-familiarity items, because
their individuating properties are less robustly encoded and their
representations are less well differentiated from semantic neigh-
bors (see Rogers and McClelland (2004), for simulations). We refer
to this cause of impairment, be it from noisy processing or damage
to the semantic hub, as representational distortion.
Table 1
Background neuropsychological data for the semantic dementia patients.






64 64 52 52
AN 64 M 9 63 53 48 48
LS 60 M 13 63 43 49 49
MC 58 M 20 63 50 49 49
ATe 65 M 20 58 10 44 47
NS 68 F 9 57 13 41 44
MA 63 M 13 57 13 34 42
SJ 60 F 11 51 11 32 45
EK 59 F 10 46 17 36 35
ATh 60 M 10 46 20 31 30
JCh 58 M 10 46 33 36 40
KH 59 M 9 41 22 37 37
GT 70 F 9 32 11 32 37
JG 68 F 11 29 6 28 38
PD 72 F 9 17 4 26 26
MK 66 F 12 11 2 26 33
YrsEd=years of education. WPM=10 alternative forced-choice word-picture
matching. PPT=Pyramids and Palm Trees test.
Table 2
Background neuropsychological data for the semantic aphasia patients.
Case Age Sex YrsEd Neuroimaging summary BDAE classification WPM Naming PPT-words PPT-pics
Max score
NY 63 M 10 L frontal–temporal–parietal Conduction 60 55 42 47
SC 76 M 11 L occipital–temporal (and R frontal–parietal) Anomic/TSA 59 28 51 50
PG 59 M 13 L frontal and capsular (CT) TSA 58 46 43 42
BB 55 F 11 L frontal and capsular (CT) MTC 54 10 35 41
KH 73 M 9 L occipital–temporal and frontal MTC 54 30 39 41
ME 36 F 11 L occipital–temporal TSA 50 5 39 29
MS 73 F 9 – Global 46 0 34 41
LS 71 M 10 L temporal–parietal–frontal TSA 37 5 39 31
KA 74 M 9 L frontal–temporal–parietal (CT) Global 26 0 44 44
JM 69 F 13 L frontal–temporal–parietal (CT) TSA 53 30 44 35
YrsEd¼years of education. BDAE¼Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination WPM¼10 alternative forced-choice word-picture matching. PPT¼Pyramids and Palm Trees test. .
TSA¼transcortical sensory aphasia. MTC¼mixed transcortical.
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Because the abnormality in SA is located in control systems,
however, a second factor comes into play in this disorder: the
magnitude of semantic impairment will vary with the control
demands of the task and item. The factors governing recruitment
of control have been well documented in studies of classic ex-
ecutive tasks, so it is possible to anticipate some of the conditions
likely to impede semantic processing under this view. First, control
is recruited when the participant must inhibit a prepotent re-
sponse in favor of a less robust but context-appropriate response
(e.g., the conflict condition of the Stroop task; Stroop, 1935). Sec-
ond, more control is required when a target item or response must
be discriminated or selected from among many other items, as is
observed, for example, when the number of flankers increases in
the inconsistent condition of the Eriksen flankers task (Eriksen,
1995). Third, more control is required when a target item must be
discriminated from one or more very similar items, as when the
flankers are spatially closer or are perceptually more similar to the
target in the same task (Eriksen, 1995). In the context of semantic
cognition, the CSC framework thus predicts that semantic deficits
in SA will vary with the prepotency of the target response and
with the number and similarity of competing items and responses
in the task, in addition to effects of representational distortion due
to noisy processing (see Corbett et al. (2009a, 2009b, 2011) and
Noonan et al. (2010) for direct evidence of each of these factors in
SA performance).
In what follows we compare and contrast the effects of famil-
iarity, typicality, and specificity in the two groups across four
common tasks. For each task, we describe the test design and take
note of the factors that might govern impaired behavior across
conditions according to the view we have just laid out. We then
report the behavior of healthy controls and case series of patients
with SD and SA on the tasks. Our aim is to assess the face validity
of the CSC framework: does it offer a plausible account of the
documented patterns? Following this report, we consider alter-
native accounts of the differences between SD and SA and how the
current results bear on these. We conclude by considering the
more general implications of the current results for theories about
the neural bases of semantic knowledge.
2. Methods
2.1. Neuropsychological assessment and stimuli
Patients in both groups completed a typical selection of back-
ground neuropsychological assessments to confirm their diag-
noses, as well as the Cambridge Semantic Battery (Bozeat et al.,
2000) to establish the degree and multimodal nature of the se-
mantic impairment for each patient (see Tables 1 and 2).
The principal novel contribution was the development and use
of the Levels of Familiarity, Typicality, and Specificity (LOFTS) se-
mantic battery. The central aim was to develop a set of items from
a range of conceptual domains that would allow us to investigate
independent effects of familiarity, typicality, and specificity in
different semantic tasks. The items themselves and the details of
the process by which they were selected are provided in Supple-
mentary Materials.
The battery is comprised of two item subsets. The Typicality
subset includes 16 triplets of items. Items within a triplet are mat-
ched for rated familiarity but vary in rated prototypicality, with each
triplet containing one highly typical (rated 1–2 on a 7 point Likert
scale), one moderately typical (rated 2–4.5) and one atypical item
(rated above 4.5). These items thus allow us to assess effects of ty-
picality unconfounded with familiarity. The Specificity subset con-
tains 22 pairs of items, with each pair comprised of two recognizable
subordinates of the same intermediate/basic-level category, one
higher in rated familiarity and one lower. For instance, one pair in-
cludes two different varieties of cheese, one rated as highly familiar
(cheddar) and one as less familiar (brie) (note that these assignments
may be specific to the culture of the UK, where this research was
conducted); another includes two varieties of large cats, one more
familiar (lion) and one less (panther). All items were named by
healthy controls with greater than 75% agreement. Thus this subset
allows us to assess specific level naming and recognition and effects
of familiarity on these abilities. Three pairs of items from the Speci-
ficity subset also appeared as items in the Typicality subset, so that
the battery includes 86 items total. The items span a variety of ca-
tegories, including animals, vehicles, tools, foods, and plants.
These LOFTS items were then used in semantic tasks that both
do and do not require speech output: picture naming and category
fluency for the former, word–picture matching and sorting for the
latter. Section 3 is subdivided according to these tasks and so, in
that section, we will describe each test before presenting the data.
2.2. Patient groups
The SD cohort consisted of 15 patients, though not all cases
participated in every facet of the study: N's per task varied from 10
to 14 and will be indicated in the corresponding section. Each case
was initially seen by a senior neurologist/physician in UK hospital
clinics in either Cambridge or Bath. Standard psychiatric rating
scales were applied to exclude major psychiatric disorders such as
depression and schizophrenia, and each patient also had structural
brain imaging and the usual battery of screening blood tests to
exclude treatable causes of dementia. All patients fulfilled the in-
ternational consensus and local criteria for SD (Gorno-Tempini
et al., 2011; Hodges et al., 1992; Neary et al., 1998), including im-
paired receptive and expressive content-word vocabulary and
impoverished semantic knowledge with relative preservation of
nonverbal reasoning, visuospatial abilities, phonology, syntax and
day-to-day memory, and with MRI-confirmed focal atrophy in
rostro-ventral regions of the temporal lobe. The majority of these
cases have already been included in one or more previous pub-
lications on SD (for example, Patterson et al.,2006), so we have not
provided detailed descriptions here. Demographic characteristics
and some basic background neuropsychological data are given in
Table 1.
The SA group consisted of 10 patients, recruited from stroke
groups and speech and language therapy services in Manchester,
UK. All of these patients have been described in previous papers
(for example, Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006; Noonan et al.,
2010). Patients with chronic aphasia following a CVA at least a year
previously were selected for inclusion in the study if they showed
semantic impairment on both the picture and the word versions of
a challenging 4AFC test of semantic association. These inclusion
criteria were used by Jefferies and Lambon Ralph (2006) to assess
whether patients who failed the same range of neuropsychological
assessments despite differing aetiologies (CVA and SD) and dis-
tributions of brain damage would show qualitative differences in
the pattern of semantic impairment. The SA patients were not
specifically selected to show a deficit of semantic control, but
nevertheless all of the cases showed clear effects of these ma-
nipulations in subsequent testing (e.g., Noonan et al., 2010).
The degree of semantic deficit ranged from moderately severe
(e.g., cases LS and KA) to very mild (e.g., patient SC, who was
within the normal range on the similar but easier 2AFC Pyramids
and Palm Trees test; see data in Table 2). Five of the SA patients,
who could be classified as cases of transcortical sensory aphasia,
had relatively fluent speech and good repetition. The remaining
cases had less fluent speech and/or poorer repetition (see Table 2
for details of aphasia classification from Boston Diagnostic Aphasia
Examination). Table 2 also summarizes the lesion for each aphasic
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stroke patient. MRI was available for five cases (NY, SC, ME, KH, LS)
and CT was available for a further two (BB, KA). It was not possible
to obtain scans for three patients (PG, JM, MS) due to a lack of
consent or contraindications for MRI, although written reports of
previous CT scans were available for PG and JM. In line with the
literature on semantic impairment in stroke aphasia, all of the
patients had left temporoparietal- and/or frontal-lobe lesions.
2.3. Control participants
Performance on the tasks by the SA and SD patients was
compared to a group of 12 neurologically-intact participants who
were age- and education-matched to the patients.
3. Results
3.1. Task 1: picture naming
As noted earlier, both groups are anomic but with quite dif-
ferent profiles. In the first task we assessed picture naming with
the LOFTS materials, with the aim of understanding how the pa-
tients' anomia is influenced by familiarity, typicality and
specificity.
Predicted effects of familiarity. Prior work has distinguished SA
from virtually all other forms of anomia, including SD, in the
negligible impact of frequency/familiarity on SA naming accuracy.
In the Cambridge 64-item naming task, for instance, the same SA
cohort as in the current study showed about 33% correct naming of
both higher- and lower-familiarity items, with no significant dif-
ference in accuracy. In the same study, patients with SD showed a
highly reliable advantage in naming higher-familiarity items
(Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006). Hoffman et al. (2011) offered a
potential explanation consistent with the CSC framework: more
frequent words, because they occur in more diverse meaning
contexts, become more polysemous and so place greater demands
on control systems, which must help to resolve which meanings
are relevant to a given situation. In the case of basic-level naming,
for instance, an image of a highly familiar item may generate a
pattern of activation in the hub which in turn begins to activate a
representation of the corresponding basic-level name (“bird”).
Because the word is high frequency, it is associated with a variety
of meanings (for instance, “bird” as slang for “woman”). Thus re-
entrant feedback from the word form to the hub may push the hub
representation toward these other meanings, generating compe-
tition that must be resolved. Lower-frequency basic-level terms
are associated with a narrower range of meanings, so the “echo”
back from word-form to hub keeps the hub representation within
the right neighborhood, generating less competition.
This explanation applies particularly to basic-level names
which, as the default label, are applied across many different si-
tuations. More specific labels, in contrast, are applied within more
restricted contexts, such as when the speaker wishes to refer to
one among many exemplars of the same basic category (Wales
et al., 1983). Thus specific labels should generally be less poly-
semous than basic-level items, and the control demands for spe-
cific naming of higher versus lower frequency items should be
better matched—in which case, the same patients who show
negligible familiarity effects when naming at the basic level should
show significant effects for specific-level naming. Patients with SD
should also show worse accuracy for specific naming of lower
familiarity items, because these are less robustly encoded in the
network, and because the corresponding representations are less
well differentiated from their neighbors.
Predicted effects of typicality. In SD, loss of knowledge about
properties that individuate semantic neighbors predicts a
typicality advantage in naming, even when familiarity is con-
trolled, since typical items share many properties with their
neighbors and have few individuating properties (Rosch et al.,
1976b). Accordingly, in a very large-N study of naming in SD,
Woollams et al. (2008) have shown significantly better naming of
more typical items even after partialling out the effects of fre-
quency/familiarity.
What pattern is expected with degraded control? In SA, effects
of representational distortion may be counteracted by control
demands: by virtue of their similarity to other category members,
typical items are likely to activate many related semantic re-
presentations, each with a different name. Atypical items will
generate less competition because they are more distal to other
category members (see Supplementary Materials). Naming may
therefore require a greater degree of semantic control for more
typical items, a factor that favors relative preservation of more
atypical items in SA. The balance of representational distortion
versus control demands is difficult to anticipate, but if anything
the typicality advantage expected in SD, where control is not a
major deficit, should be attenuated in SA.
Predicted effects of specificity. In both disorders, all relevant
factors predict worse naming at the specific level than in the
standard basic-level naming task: specific-level names are gen-
erally less frequent, require individuation of closely related items,
and demand greater control since they are not the “automatic”
names produced across many contexts.
3.1.1. Participants
Ten of the 15 patients with SD completed the naming task.
Assessment of the more seriously impaired patients was aban-
doned after one such patient was unable to complete the task.
Likewise, naming was not attempted in the three SA cases with
severe expressive aphasia.
3.1.2. Procedure
Participants named colored photographs of the Typicality and
Specificity subsets in two different sessions. Participants who
produced correct responses more general than the target (e.g.,
“bird” instead of “robin”) were prompted for a more specific name
by asking “Do you know what kind it is?” Responses were scored
as correct if the same name had been produced by at least two
controls in the original item-screening study. Incorrect responses
were classified as one of the following error types: level error,
reflecting an overly-general response (e.g., DALMATIAN- “dog” or
“animal”; DOG- “animal”), semantic error, circumlocution, pho-
nological error or no-response. Where the respondent self-cor-
rected, the recorded response was the final item generated. Any
other response, such as the production of a name with no clear
relationship to the target, a nonsense utterance, or an associative
error, was classified as “other”.
3.1.3. Results
The SD cohort was divided into two groups based on a median
split. The milder group was closely matched to the SA group in
naming accuracy on the standard Cambridge battery.
Fig. 1A shows the mean and standard error of the accuracy for
each group in naming the Typicality subset. Controls performed
better for more atypical items, whereas patients with SD showed
the opposite effect. The SA cohort, in contrast to both controls and
SD, was unaffected by typicality. Accordingly, a paired-samples t-
test comparing accuracy on the highest and lowest typicality items
showed reliably different accuracy for the mild SD cohort (t¼4.74,
df¼4, po0.01) but not the SA cohort (t¼0.67, df¼4, p¼n.s.).
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Effects of typicality across the two groups were compared with
a logistic mixed effects model (see Supplementary Materials).
Fig. 1B shows expected accuracies generated from the fitted model,
while Fig. 1C shows the data for individual participants. In addition
to the expected effect of semantic severity on naming accuracy,
the analysis revealed no difference between groups in the overall
degree of anomia and no main effect of typicality, but a marginally
reliable interaction between patient group and typicality
(B¼0.51, Z¼1.95, po0.052), with typicality exerting a larger
effect on accuracy for the SD than the SA group.
Finally, Fig. 1D shows the distribution of error types as a propor-
tion of all errors, calculated separately for high-typical, medium-ty-
pical, and low-typical items, across each patient group. To assess
whether the distribution of error types differed across patients with a
comparably severe anomia, we computed a χ2 statistic comparing the
error frequency across types in the SA and mild SD cohorts. The two
groups showed reliably different patterns of errors (χ2¼39, df¼4,
po0.001), and inspection of Fig. 1D illustrates why. Consistent with
prior work, patients with milder SD made frequent no-response er-
rors, especially on the lowest-typicality subset, and fairly frequent
Fig. 1. Naming performance for the Typicality subset. (A) Mean and standard errors of accuracy (proportion correct) for controls and patient cohorts at different levels of
typicality. (B) Predicted accuracy from a logistic mixed effects model. (C) Individual patient accuracy for each level of typicality. (D) Error distributions by typicality for each
patient group. Incorrect responses are categorized as level errors (LEV), reflecting an overly-general response (e.g., DALMATION- “dog”), semantic errors (SEM), cir-
cumlocutions (CIRC), no-response (NR), responses that are phonologically related to the target (PHON) and other errors.
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level errors, especially on high- and mid-typicality targets. They
produced a moderate number of semantic and circumlocution errors,
and no phonological or other errors. The SA cohort showed the re-
verse pattern: relatively more semantic and circumlocution errors,
relatively fewer level and omission errors, and a small but non-zero
number of phonological and other errors. In more advanced SD cases,
the pattern is fairly similar to the milder sub-group, though a couple
of “other” errors have crept in.
Fig. 2A shows the mean and standard error of naming accuracy
for the Specific subset. Controls were marginally less likely to
Fig. 2. Naming performance for the Specific subset. (A) Mean and standard errors of accuracy (proportion correct) for controls and the patient cohorts for lower and higher
familiarity items. (B) Predicted accuracy on the Specific subset from a logistic mixed effects model. (C) Individual patient accuracy for lower and higher familiarity items.
(D) Error distributions by familiarity for each patient group. Incorrect responses are categorized as level errors (LEV), reflecting an overly-general response (e.g., DALMA-
TIAN- “dog”), semantic errors (SEM), circumlocutions (CIRC), no-response (NR), responses that are phonologically related to the target (PHON) and other errors.
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produce a correct response for lower-frequency than higher-fre-
quency items (paired-samples t¼1.93, df¼11, po0.08). This effect
was greatly amplified in all three patient cohorts. Notably, whereas
prior work has shown little or no frequency effect in basic-level
naming in SA (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006), a reliable fre-
quency effect was observed in this task (paired-samples t¼4.49,
df¼4, po0.02). As expected, a highly significant frequency effect
was observed in the mild SD cohort (paired-samples t¼14.41,
df¼4, po0.001).
Effects in the two groups were again compared with a logistic
mixed effects model (see Supplementary Materials). Expected
behavior from the model is shown in Fig. 2B, while the data for
individual cases is shown in Fig. 2C. In addition to the expected
effect of semantic impairment severity, the model revealed a re-
liable effect of item frequency with worse performance for low-
frequency items (B¼1.56, Z¼2.72, po0.007), but no effect of
group and no interaction between group and frequency. Thus in
contrast to prior results from basic-level naming, frequency ap-
pears to have a similar impact on specific-level naming in the two
patient groups.
Finally, we again compared the distribution of error types
across the two patient groups using a χ2 test on the count of errors
across types, summed across all participants in each patient group.
The probability of each error type, computed separately for high-
and low-frequency items, is shown in Fig. 2D. The distribution
again differed significantly from chance (χ2¼73, po0.0001), with
a similar profile to that observed on the Typicality subset: relative
to SA, patients with SD made more level and no-response errors,
fewer semantic and circumlocution errors, and no phonological or
other errors.
3.1.4. Summary
The results are generally consistent with the CSC framework.
Patients with SD showed a typicality advantage in naming that
was especially striking in contrast to controls, who showed the
reverse effect. No typicality effect was observed in patients with
SA, consistent with the view that the typicality advantage arising
from noisy processing is attenuated by the greater competition
elicited by typical items. With regard to familiarity, patients with
SA showed frequency effects for specific-level naming equal in
magnitude to those observed in SD, in contrast to prior results of
basic-level naming. This might be anticipated by the CSC frame-
work since specific labels are less polysemous than basic-level
items, and thus competition is minimized. We also note that
specific-level naming was substantially worse than standard basic-
level naming for all patients, though this is not surprising given
that all factors mediate toward such a result. Finally, consistent
with prior work, the two groups showed quite different distribu-
tions of naming errors.
3.2. Task 2: picture sorting
In the second task participants were asked to sort pictures of
the LOFTS items into three either very general semantic categories
(animal, plant, manmade object) or three more specific categories
(e.g. for animals: land, air, water creature), across two different
sessions. The same items were used in the specific and general
sorts, allowing us to estimate effects of specificity unconfounded
with familiarity. Relative to naming, uncertainty about the size or
nature of the response set was eliminated because this set (i.e., the
three sorting categories) is explicitly specified. Moreover, the task
requires no verbal response, so, in contrast to naming, patterns of
impairment cannot be directly attributed speech production def-
icits. Finally, though the task manipulates the specificity of the
sorting categories, even the more specific condition involves
discerning more general distinctions than those required by
naming. What then are the relevant factors for understanding fa-
miliarity, typicality, and specificity in this task?
Predicted effects of familiarity. The CSC framework predicts that,
in contrast to naming, familiarity effects should be reduced or
eliminated in this task in both disorders. Such effects arise in
naming because highly familiar items are better differentiated
from their immediate semantic neighbors—for instance, re-
presentations of dogs will be better-differentiated from those of
wolves, foxes, and coyotes. Thus lower-frequency items are more
likely comingle with representational distortion. Regardless of
their individual frequency, however, all such four-legged land
animals will be equally well differentiated from more distal con-
cepts, such as various birds, fish, vehicles, and so on. Thus fre-
quency/familiarity should have a strong effect when the task re-
quires individuation of an item from its close neighbors, as in
naming, but not when the items are to be differentiated frommore
distal concepts, as in sorting.
Predicted effects of typicality. As already noted, highly typical
items share many properties with their semantic neighbors and
possess few individuating properties—thus such items are prox-
imal to their neighbors and distal to items from different cate-
gories. Atypical items are more distal to members of the same
category, but more similar to members of other categories—for
instance, jellyfish, because they lack eyes, fins, tails, and so on, are
less similar to other marine animals and more similar to plants
(see Supplementary Materials). Thus atypical items are more likely
than typical items to be confused with members of a neighboring
category when representations are distorted. Of course, such ef-
fects will be greatly reduced when the sorting categories are very
semantically distinct. Thus representational distortion predicts a
typicality advantage, especially for the more specific sorting task.
Control demands likewise favor typical items in this task: though
such items activate many similar representations, all such items
will belong to the same sorting class and so will bring about a
similar response, producing little competition (similar to the
consistent conditions of classic control tasks). Atypical items likely
activate fewer semantic representations overall, but are more
likely to activate items from different response categories, thus
generating more competition, especially for more specific sorting.
Thus both representational distortion and control demands predict
worse performance for atypical items that is most pronounced for
specific-level sorting.
Predicted effects of specificity. Representational distortion will
produce worse performance in the more specific condition, since
the different sorting categories are semantically more proximal in
this condition. With regard to control demands, some relevant
factors are matched across conditions: the number of response
options is held constant, and the set of semantic representations
activated by a given item support the same sorting response and
so generate little competition as already noted. The main factor
likely to influence behavior again arises from semantic proximity
of the responses: options are more similar in the Specific condi-
tion, so if anything control demands should be higher (and per-
formance worse) in this condition. Thus disordered control also
favors greater impairment of more specific sorting.
In summary, the two groups are expected to look qualitatively
similar, showing a null or attenuated effect of familiarity, a typi-
cality advantage especially for specific sorting, and an advantage
for general sorting.
3.2.1. Participants
The task was completed by the same age-matched controls as
previously, by 9 patients in the SA cohort and all but one of the
patients in the SD cohort.
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3.2.2. Stimuli
All items from the two subsets were administered except for a
small number of food items that did not fit the more specific
sorting categories; an additional set of filler items was added to
the set to balance the number of items appearing in each category.
Performance on these items was not considered when computing
accuracy scores.
3.2.3. Procedure
The task was administered over two testing sessions on dif-
ferent days. In the first session, participants were asked to sort the
pictures into three categories corresponding to animals, plants or
manmade objects. Printed category labels were placed on the table
facing the participants and were read aloud on each trial. In the
second session, participants were asked to sort the animals into
land, water, or air creatures; the plants into trees, flowers, or fruits/
vegetables; and finally the manmade objects into vehicles, cloth-
ing, or tools.
3.2.4. Results
Control performance was near ceiling and was not investigated
further. Fig. 3 shows sorting accuracy as a function of level (general
or specific) in each patient cohort for the Typicality subset. In both
cases, performance was better for the general than the specific
sort, and in both cases accuracy was better for more typical items,
especially at the more specific level. These observations from
group means were also mirrored in the individual patient data.
Logistic mixed effects modeling was again used to compare
effects across groups (see Supplementary Materials). As Fig. 3
makes clear, a qualitatively similar pattern was observed across
groups, with both groups showing a typicality advantage that is
much more pronounced for more specific sorting. The mixed ef-
fects model revealed, however, that the magnitude of the effects
differed reliably between groups. For the general sorting condi-
tion, overall performance was better for the SD than the SA group
(B¼3.84, Z¼2.62, po0.009), and across groups a reliable effect of
typicality was observed for specific but not general sorting
(B¼0.78, Z¼2.27, po0.03). The effects of level and typicality,
and the interaction between these, all themselves interacted with
patient group. In the general sort, the effect of typicality was larger
in the SD than in the SA group (B¼1.19, Z¼2.177, po0.03), a
result that can also be observed in the individual patient plots and
means. The difference in accuracy between general and specific
levels was also significantly larger in the SD than the SA group
(B¼3.54, Z¼2.27, po0.03). Finally, patients with SD showed a
larger effect of typicality than those with SA at the general level
(B¼1.19, Z¼2.177, po0.03), but a smaller effect at the specific
level (B¼1.2, Z¼2.03, po0.05). In summary, while typicality ex-
erts a larger influence on specific than on general sorting in both
groups, these influences are more similar across levels in SD, while
the effect of specificity is more pronounced in SD than in SA.
We also considered whether the poor performance for low-
typicality items in both groups arose because the correct answer
for some items might be ambiguous when sorting at the specific-
level. For instance, penguins might be considered either land or
water animals, leading to uncertainty that might be exacerbated in
patient participants. From the control data, we identified six items
where controls showed less than 80% agreement as to the specific-
level category (frog, crocodile, penguin, swan, duck and bat). Re-
moving these items left the pattern of results unchanged: both
patient groups showed equivalently good performance on high
and medium typicality items (91% correct at both levels in both
groups) but very significant impairments for low-typicality items
(69% correct for SA, 64% for SD, as compared to 98% correct for
controls). Thus poor sorting of atypical items occurs even for items
whose specific-category membership is unambiguous to controls.
Fig. 4 shows sorting accuracy for the Specificity subset as a
function of level, familiarity and patient group. In both groups,
means show little difference between higher and lower familiarity
items but worse performance for the more specific condition.
Expected performance from a logistic mixed effects model (see
Supplementary Materials) is shown in the bottom row of Fig. 4.
The SD cohort performed better than the SA patients at the more
general sort (B¼1.54, Z¼3.34, po0.001) and in both patient
groups performance was reliably worse for the more specific
sorting task (B¼0.68, Z¼2.20, po0.03). No effect of item fa-
miliarity was observed nor was the interaction of any model
variable with patient group significant.
3.2.5. Summary
The results are again consistent with the CSC view. Whereas
naming showed a significant familiarity advantage in both groups,
no familiarity effect was observed at either level for sorting.
Whereas naming showed different sensitivity to typicality across
groups, both groups showed the same pattern in sorting: a typi-
cality advantage for more specific sorting that was attenuated at
more general sorting. Finally, both groups showed worse perfor-
mance for the more specific sort, especially for less typical items.
The patterns were qualitatively similar in the two groups, though
statistical analysisshowed that the magnitude of the effects dif-
fered reliably , with specificity exerting a stronger effect in SD, and
typicality exerting a more similar effect across levels in SD.
3.3. Task 3: word–picture matching varying the semantic distance of
foils
In the third task, we used word–picture matching to assess
comprehension of the LOFTS items while varying the precision
with which the concept must be understood. Across conditions,
the same probe image appears but the distractor pictures vary in
their semantic distance from the target. For instance, the probe
word “cheetah” is paired with the same target picture, once with
other cat pictures as distractors, once with non-feline mammals,
once with non-mammal animals, and once with non-animals. The
probe word is always a specific or basic level name, so the task
always requires the participant to resolve the word and image
meanings sufficiently well to discriminate these from semantic
neighbors. This contrasts with picture sorting, where even the
more specific sort could be accomplished through relatively coarse
semantic distinctions. Thus the view we have developed predicts
somewhat different effects of familiarity, typicality, and specificity
in this task.
Predicted effects of familiarity. More familiar items are better
differentiated from their neighbors, leading to greater preserva-
tion especially of more specific names and attributes when re-
presentations are distorted. Control demands likewise ought to
favor more familiar items: first, more familiar names are likely to
be more prepotent, and second, specific names are less likely to be
highly polysemous, as argued above for naming. Thus in contrast
to sorting, both groups should show a familiarity advantage.
Predicted effects of typicality. Relative to typical items, atypical
items are both more distal to members of their own categories and
more similar to members of other categories. Thus when re-
presentations are distorted, atypical items are less likely than ty-
pical items to be confused with closer distractors, but more likely
to be confused with more distal distractors. Control demands will
be similarly affected: typical items will activate representations of
many semantic neighbors, each possessing a different name, and
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Fig. 3. Picture sorting at general (green) and specific (red) levels for the Typicality subset; more typical items are depicted with more saturated colors. Top: mean and
standard errors of accuracy for patient cohorts at each level of typicality. Middle: individual accuracy at each level of specificity for general and specific levels. Bottom:
predicted accuracy from a logistic mixed effects model. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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Fig. 4. Picture sorting at general (green) and specific (red) levels for the Specific subset; higher-familiarity items are depicted with more saturated colors. Top: mean and
standard errors of accuracy for patient cohorts at each level of familiarity. Middle: individual accuracy at each level of familiarity for general and specific levels. Bottom:
predicted accuracy from a logistic mixed effects model. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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so will generate competition that is especially fierce when dis-
tractors are close. Atypical items are more likely to compete with
items from neighboring categories and so will elicit greater control
demands than typical items when distractors are more distal. Thus
both representational distortion and control demands predict an
interaction between typicality and distractor proximity, with a
typicality advantage for more distal but not more proximal
distractors.
Predicted effects of specificity. Representational distortion pro-
duces confusion of semantically related items, an effect that favors
better performance when distractors are semantically more distal.
Although the number of distractors in each array is held constant
across levels, control demands are nevertheless likely to be higher
for more proximal distractors since these are more similar to the
target and hence generate a greater degree of competition. Thus
representational distortion and disordered control both predict
worse performance for more proximal distractors.
In summary, the CSC framework again predicts qualitatively
similar effects in the two groups: better performance for more
familiar items and for more distal distractors, and an interaction
between typicality and distractor proximity, with typicality fa-
vouring performance when distractors are more distal but not
when they are more proximal.
3.3.1. Participants
Participants were the same as in the sorting task.
Fig. 5. Word–picture matching performance with distal (green) and proximal (red) distractors for the Typicality subset; more typical items are shown with more saturated
colors. Top: Mean and standard error of accuracy (proportion correct) for each level of typicality and distractor distance, for the semantic aphasia (left) and semantic
dementia (right) cohorts. Bottom: predicted accuracy from a logistic mixed effects model. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
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3.3.2. Stimuli
Stimuli were arrays of color photographs, each with a target
item and six distractors. The arrays were organized into four
subsets varying in the semantic distance between the target and
distractor items, which could be very close (same basic category),
close (same intermediate category), distal (same superordinate
domain) or unrelated (different superordinate domain). For items
in the Specific subset, each photograph appeared once as a target
at each level of specificity. For items in the Typicality subset, each
photograph appeared once with close distractors and once with
distal distractors. Target and distractor images appeared in ap-
proximately 5 arrays on average so that overall familiarity would
not serve as a cue to the correct target. Further details are provided
in Supplementary Materials.
3.3.3. Procedure
The test was administered in four blocks, each carried out on a
different day. For each trial, the tester showed the array of images
to the participant, read the word printed at the top of the page,
and asked the participant to point to the item that matched the
word. Patient participants completed all four testing blocks.
Healthy controls completed a single block of testing, using only the
most proximal distractors for each item, as it was anticipated that
performance would be at ceiling for other proximity levels.
3.3.4. Results
Fig. 5 shows performance of each patient group for the Typi-
cality subset, as a function of semantic severity, the semantic
Fig. 6. Word–picture matching performance for the Specific subset, showing accuracy as a function of distractor distance (colder colors¼more distal distractors, warmer
colors¼proximal distractors) and item familiarity (more saturated¼higher familiarity). Top: mean and standard errors of accuracy (proportion correct) by distance, fa-
miliarity, and patient group. Bottom: predicted accuracy from a logistic mixed effects model. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
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distance of the distractors and item typicality. Individual patient
data, though not shown, align well with the aggregate data. In
both groups accuracy was worse for more proximal distractors, but
the effect appeared to interact with typicality in both groups: for
proximal distractors, increased typicality either reduced perfor-
mance (milder SA) or at least failed to help it (SD and more severe
SA), but distal distractors showed a typicality advantage.
Expected performance from a logistic mixed effects model (see
Supplementary Materials) is shown in the bottom row of Fig. 5.
Consistent with the preceding observations, the analysis revealed
a reliable effect of impairment severity (B¼0.06, Z¼5.35,
po0.001) and of semantic distance, with worse performance for
closer distractors (B¼2.25, Z¼4.22, po0.001) and no difference
between groups. No main effect of typicality was observed, but
typicality interacted significantly with semantic distance, in the
same way across patient groups (B¼ .53, Z¼2.17, po0.04).
Fig. 5 shows why: more typical items elicited lower or equivalent
accuracy when distractors were close neighbors, but higher ac-
curacy when distractors were more distal. Overall performance did
not differ between patient groups, nor did group interact reliably
with any other variable.
Fig. 6A shows accuracy for the Specific subset, which was
probed across four levels of distractor, from very close (same basic
level category) to very distal (different conceptual domain). In
both groups accuracy grew with the distance of the distractors.
The effect appeared more pronounced in the SA than the SD co-
horts, however. Both groups performed worse for less familiar
items, but in this case the effect appeared more pronounced in the
SD group.
Fig. 6B shows expected performance from a logistic mixed ef-
fects model (Supplementary Materials). Accuracy was reliably in-
fluenced by the severity of the impairment (B¼0.06, Z¼4.81,
po0.001), the distance of the distractors (B¼0.59, Z¼6.80,
po0.001), and the concept familiarity (B¼0.73, Z¼2.17,
po0.03) across both groups, with the SA cohort showing a large
effect of distance and a modest effect of familiarity while the SD
cohort showed a smaller effect of distance (B¼ .41, Z¼3.71,
po0.001) and a larger effect of familiarity (B¼ .63, Z¼2.44,
po0.02).
3.3.5. Summary
The results are qualitatively consistent with the CSC frame-
work: both groups showed a reliable advantage for more familiar
items (in contrast to sorting) and for arrays with more distal dis-
tractors, as well as the expected interaction between typicality and
semantic proximity. As in sorting, the analysis also revealed reli-
able differences in the magnitude of these effects across groups,
with the SD cohort showing a larger effect of familiarity and a
smaller effect of proximity relative to the SA cohort.
3.4. Task 4: category versus letter fluency
Tasks 2 and 3 can be viewed as minimizing or holding constant
some of the factors that influence demand for cognitive control. In
the final study we considered data from verbal fluency, a task that
draws on several cognitive abilities, including semantic and pho-
nological knowledge, and is also known to strongly tax executive
systems. Like naming, the participant must decide which of many
possible competing responses to produce and must generate the
correct phonological form of each item, but further demands on
control also arise: the participant must maintain an effective
mental search for possible responses, compare candidate re-
sponses to the fluency criterion and inhibit inappropriate items,
monitor performance, remember prior responses and use this
memory to avoid repetition.
Though verbal fluency draws simultaneously on many cogni-
tive abilities, prior work has shown that different neuropsycho-
logical impairments can produce contrastive patterns of dysfunc-
tion across different variants of the task. For instance, patients
with dysexecutive symptoms and generally fluent speech exhibit
considerable and equivalent degrees of impairment in letter-flu-
ency and category-fluency, whereas patients with semantic de-
mentia generally perform worse at the latter than the former
(Hodges et al., 1992). Thus, comparing patterns of deficits across
different fluency tasks can shed light on the underlying causes of
impairment. Specifically, fluency for semantic categories (e.g., an-
imals, vehicles) requires the participant to generate a set of se-
mantically related words, whereas fluency for phonological/or-
thographic categories (e.g., “words beginning with F”) does not
draw significantly upon knowledge of semantic structure, and in
fact may require suppression of semantic associates that spring to
mind. Both tasks share the executive components noted above, but
category fluency additionally requires knowledge of semantic
structure and letter fluency has additional control demands. What
then should fluency impairments look like in the two disorders?
Typicality and familiarity. Because the fluency task is open-
ended, we could not experimentally vary the typicality or famil-
iarity of the items produced.
Predicted effects of specificity. The effect of specificity on verbal
fluency was investigated by comparing performance on two more
general categories (animals, vehicles) versus two subordinates of
these (dogs, boats). General categories permit production of items
that are more semantically distal, whereas more specific categories
require production of items that are all semantically related. Thus
representational distortion should produce greater impairment for
more specific categories in SD. Both general and specific fluency
place considerable demands on control processes, however, so
disordered control should lead to very poor performance in both
conditions, potentially attenuating any effect of specificity in SA.
Assessing the role of cognitive control in SA and SD. Finally, the
contrast of semantic and letter fluency may shed light on the
proposal that semantic dysfunction in SA arises from disordered
control. If fluency impairments are mainly caused by disordered
control in SA, the impairments should be equally severe regardless
of the particular fluency task, since the tasks share many of the
same control demands. In contrast, if the impairments in SD are
caused by distortion of semantic representations, these should be
more pronounced in category than letter fluency, since the former
explicitly requires knowledge of semantic structure. This view thus
suggests that (a) category and letter fluency should be equally
impaired in SA, (b) letter fluency should be less impaired than
category fluency in SD (as has been often observed, e.g. Hodges
et al., 1992) and (c) patients with SA should be more impaired than
patients with SD on letter fluency, but not category fluency. Finally,
the nature of the errors should differ between groups. Specifically,
patients with SA should produce more incorrect responses in all
tasks, as they have difficulty inhibiting either inappropriate as-
sociates or prior responses.
3.4.1. Participants
In the SD cohort, all participants completed the category-flu-
ency task and all but two (KH and JG) completed the letter fluency
task. In the SA cohort, all bar the most severely impaired partici-
pant (KA) completed both tasks. Sixteen healthy controls age-
matched to the SD cohort completed the two tasks.
3.4.2. Procedure
For each fluency task, participants were given one minute to
list as many items as they could think. Fluency data were collected
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for two general semantic categories (animals, vehicles), for two
specific categories that are subordinate to the same general cate-
gories (birds, boats), and for the letters F, A, and S.
3.4.3. Results
Fig. 7 (left) shows the mean number of correct responses
generated for general and specific semantic categories, collapsed
across all patients in each group. Both groups produced fewer
correct items for specific relative to general categories, though the
relative magnitudes of the impairments are hard to assess because
controls also showed this pattern [mean (standard deviation)
general categories¼15.4 (3.0); specific categories¼13.6 (3.4):
po0.03 paired-samples t-test]. The right panels thus show Z-
scored performance plotted against the magnitude of semantic
impairment estimated from standard tasks. In SD performance is
worse for specific than for general categories, and declines with
the severity of the semantic impairment. The pattern in SA is
different: performance does not reliably decline with increasing
semantic impairment but is poor across the board, and is equally
poor for general and specific level categories.
These observations were tested with a linear mixed effects
model (see Supplementary Materials). Overall severity of the se-
mantic impairment was found to improve model fit for SD but not
the SA group (χ2¼9.4, po0.003). Model fit did not reliably
improve when level of specificity was added to this model as a
simple effect, but addition of a term for the interaction of speci-
ficity with patient group did reliably improve model fit (χ2¼5.5,
po0.02), indicating different effects of specificity in the two
groups. Together the analysis suggests that (a) degree of impair-
ment in the task correlates with degree of semantic impairment in
the SD group only, and (b) performance is reliably worse for more
specific categories in the SD but not the SA group.
Fig. 8 (left) shows the mean number of correct responses
generated per category across the letter (top) and semantic fluency
(bottom) tasks, collapsed across all patients in each group. The
effects of patient group, task type, and severity of the semantic
impairment were again assessed with a mixed linear model pre-
dicting standardized performance (Z-scores of number of correct
items generated). We found no effect of the composite semantic
score on its own, but a reliable interaction between this score and
task type (χ2¼7.2, po0.01), indicating that semantic severity ex-
erted different effects on the two fluency tasks. Similarly, patient
group did not improve model fit on its own but interacted reliably
with task type (χ2¼3.7, po0.05), with a larger discrepancy be-
tween tasks for the SD than the SA group. The interaction between
the composite semantic score and patient group was not reliable
but the three-way interaction amongst this score, patient group
and task type marginally improved model fit (χ2¼3.32, po0.07).
Thus the mixed model analyses support the impression from
Fig. 7. Performance on the category fluency task for more general and more specific categories. Left panels show mean and standard errors of the number of correct
responses generated in each condition by patient group. Right panels show the relationship between the composite measure of semantic impairment and the number of
correct responses generated in each condition, normalized by the mean and standard deviation of the control data. Linear fits in each condition are shown; where the simple
correlation was statistically significant, r2 values are shown.
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Fig. 8: the difference between letter and category fluency is larger
in SD than SA, and the magnitude of the semantic impairment
predicts performance in the category but not the letter fluency
task, more so in the SD cohort.
We next considered the error rates across the two groups,
measured as the proportion of responses that were incorrect ei-
ther by virtue of being repetitions of previous correct responses, or
not meeting the fluency criteria. In category fluency, patients with
SD produced errors at a rate comparable to controls (5% errors for
SD in both general and specific cases, 3% for controls in both
cases). Patients with SA, in contrast, were very much more likely to
produce incorrect responses (44% for specific, 35% for general, a
specificity-difference that is not reliable by a 2-tailed paired-
samples t-test). Collapsing across general and specific levels,
the difference between patient groups was highly significant
(po0.0001, 2-tailed between-samples t-test).With regards to let-
ter fluency, patients with SAwere again significantly more likely to
produce incorrect responses (34% errors) than were patients with
SD (8% errors; po0.0001 two-tailed between-samples t-test).
Finally, we considered the nature of the errors produced in SA
across category and letter fluency tasks. The great majority were of
Table 3
Summary of effects across tasks in the SA and SD groups.
Typicality subset Typicality effect
SA SD
Picture naming NULL þ










Specificity effect Familiarity effect
SA SD SA SD
Picture naming þ þ þ þ
Picture sorting þ þ NULL NULL
Word–picture matching þþ þ þ þþ
þ Denotes the presence of effect; þþ denotes an effect which is stronger in one
patient group than that observed in the other.
Fig. 8. Comparison of performance on the category fluency task (across all categories) and the letter fluency task (across the letters F, A and S). Left panels show means and
standard errors of the number of correct responses generated for each patient group on each task. Right panels show the relationship between the composite measure of
semantic impairment and the number of correct responses generated, normalized by the control mean and standard deviation in each condition. Linear fits between these
variables are shown; where the simple correlations are stronger than expected by chance, r2 values are also shown.
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three kinds: (1) repetitions, in which a correct but previously-
generated item was produced, (2) prior-task perseverations, in
which an item from a previously-administered fluency task
was produced and (3) “semantic drift” errors in which the parti-
cipant began with an appropriate item but followed it with a
chain of semantic or thematic associates. For instance, for the ca-
tegory “birds”, one participant generated the sequence “parrot,
monkey, koala, cat, dog”, while for the letter F, another participant
generated the responses “Fred, Phyllis, Marion, Amanda, Bob,
Fred”.
3.4.4. Summary
The observations from verbal fluency are again consistent with
the CSC framework: Specificity influenced performance in SD but
not SA, and letter fluency was more impaired in SA than SD even
though the two groups showed equivalent impairment for cate-
gory fluency. Other observations were also consistent with the
proposal that the fluency deficit in SA arises from disordered
control. First, fluency performance did not correlate with the
magnitude of semantic impairment in either task, in contrast to
SD; second, many more incorrect responses were produced in SA
than SD; and third, the nature of these errors strongly suggest an
inability to inhibit incorrect items or control the search/selection
process.
4. General discussion
Across two semantic syndromes, semantic dementia (SD) and
semantic aphasia (SA), we compared and contrasted the effects of
typicality, specificity and familiarity on four tasks (picture naming,
picture sorting, word–picture matching, fluency) using a new se-
mantic battery (LOFTS). Whilst individual patients within each
group were reasonably similar to one another, the comparison
across SD and SA revealed a complex pattern of similarities and
differences across tasks and patient groups (see Table 3 for a
summary). In each case the pattern was consistent with the con-
trolled semantic cognition (CSC) framework articulated in the In-
troduction. According to this framework, impairments in SD arise
from damage to the anterior temporal lobe “semantic hub”,
whereas those in SA arise from damage to a fronto-temporopar-
ietal control system that serves to shape the flow of activation in
the cortical semantic network. Both forms of damage will produce
representational distortion: an inability to specify fine-grained
patterns of activation in the network, disrupting performance that
requires knowledge about the properties that individuate seman-
tic neighbors, especially for low-familiarity items. Because the core
impairment in SA lies in the system of control, however, the
magnitude of the deficit will scale with tasks or items that require
a greater degree of cognitive control—that is, when the task or
item requires inhibition of a prepotent response, selection
amongst a large number of competitors, or discrimination of a
target from very similar competing items. In each task, we have
shown how these factors interact to account for the similarities
and differences between patient groups. In this sense, we have
established at least the face validity of the central hypotheses.
Of course, the CSC framework is not the only approach to un-
derstanding the cognitive and neural bases of semantic cognition. In
the rest of this Discussion, we consider other hypotheses about the
neural bases of semantic abilities and their disorders, and the con-
tributions of anterior temporal versus fronto-temporoparietal sys-
tems to these abilities. We briefly review each position and its rela-
tion both to the current evidence and the CSC framework. We con-
clude with a consideration of open questions and future directions.
4.1. Semantic aphasia reflects executive dysfunction, a disorder of
speech production, or both
One possibility is that semantic aphasia does not constitute a
coherent semantic disorder at all, but arises from some mix of
executive and speech production disorders. On this view, the vi-
sual and verbal comprehension impairments that are a defining
feature of the syndrome arise from a general disruption to ex-
ecutive functioning, while anomia and disordered verbal fluency
reflect joint contributions of executive and speech production
deficits. On its face such an account offers a simple explanation of
some of the observed effects, including (1) the coincidence of se-
mantic and executive deficits in SA, (2) the generally poor per-
formance on verbal fluency regardless of specificity or task type,
which is to be expected if participants are simply dysfluent, and
(3) the frequency and types of errors produced in fluency tasks,
which are consistent with disordered control generally.
We suggest at least three general problems with such an ac-
count. The first is that it fails to explain other observations in the
current study. For instance, it does not explain (1) why specificity
does not influence verbal fluency in SA but does influence naming,
sorting, and word–picture matching, (2) why familiarity influences
specific-level but not basic-level naming or sorting in SA, (3) why
typicality exerts qualitatively similar effects in SA and SD in sorting
but not naming, or (4) why in SA typical items are disadvantaged
in word–picture matching when distractors are proximal, but ad-
vantaged when distractors are more distal. These effects all seem
to reflect joint effects of executive dysfunction and semantic re-
presentational structure, so they are difficult to understand if the
impairments arise solely from executive and speech production
deficits.
The second problem is that the effects we have documented are
observed even in patients who are capable of producing fluent
speech. If important aspects of these patterns arise from impaired
speech production, we would expect qualitatively different pat-
terns in the fluent versus dysfluent cases. In each task, however,
individual patient data adhered well to the group mean perfor-
mance, and subgroups of this kind were not apparent—fluent and
dysfluent cases behaved quite similarly, as also observed in prior
work (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006).
Third, other patient groups with clear executive and verbal
production deficits often do not show semantic impairment, sug-
gesting that neither deficit is sufficient to produce SA. For instance,
patients with the frontal variant of fronto-temporal dementia are
often un- or minimally-impaired on most semantic tasks despite
clear deficits on executive tasks (Perry and Hodges, 2000; Rogers
et al., 2006). Likewise patients with expressive aphasia, though
they often have coincident executive impairments, do not show
the nonverbal comprehension impairments that characterize SA
(Carthery-Goulart et al., 2012). These observations suggest that SA
involves something other than the conjoint disruption of executive
function and speech production.
4.2. Access versus degraded store
The CSC framework is similar in some respects to the access/
degraded storage distinction (Forde and Humphreys, 1995; Gotts
and Plaut, 2002; Mirman and Britt, 2014; Warrington and
McCarthy, 1983). On this view, semantic impairments can arise
either because information in a long-term semantic knowledge
store is degraded or because the processes that govern retrieval
from such a database are disordered. The different mechanisms
align roughly with the distinction we have proposed between
damage to the semantic hub versus semantic control systems.
When hub neurons and their synapses are damaged, the in-
formation they contain is permanently lost and, with sufficient
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damage, knowledge about associations among sets of attributes is
unavailable (not just hard to access). In this sense, patients with SD
are similar to classical “storage” patients; indeed, the original
storage patients studied by Warrington (1975) likely had semantic
dementia. When control systems degrade, the neurons and sy-
napses that encode knowledge of semantic structure and re-
lationships remain intact—the knowledge remains “in the system”
but cannot always be properly exploited in a given situation due to
noisy and disordered control. In this sense, patients with SA are
similar to classical “access” patients. Moreover, some of the phe-
nomena in SA are similar to those observed in access disorders,
including (a) low itemwise consistency across and even within
tasks, (b) significant susceptibility to cueing, and (c) comorbidity
with executive dysfunction.
Is the CSC framework just an access/storage account by a dif-
ferent name? There are at least two reasons for distinguishing the
accounts. First, the original storage/access account was developed
in a period when the mind-as-computer was a dominant moti-
vating factor in cognitive psychology. The account thus formed
itself around certain properties of digital serial computers, in-
cluding the bright line drawn between storage and retrieval. This
distinction is blurred in network-based approaches to memory
and to cognition more generally (see Rogers and McClelland
(2014), for discussion), so it becomes more difficult to know what
is specifically intended by “storage” versus “retrieval” deficits in
this context. In addition, while the access/storage distinction
concisely summarizes patients' performance characteristics, it
does not illuminate the neurocognitive mechanisms that underpin
these and other aspects of semantic cognition.
Second, the CSC framework explicitly connects disordered se-
mantic cognition in SA to current theories about cognitive control
generally and, in doing so, offers tangible hypotheses about the
key computational underpinnings of semantic cognition more
generally. A central contribution of the current work is the pro-
posal that semantic impairments in SA scale with the same factors
that govern recruitment of cognitive control. Where the task in-
volves generating a highly prepotent response with little compe-
tition, semantic impairments will be minimal, even though such a
task still requires retrieval from the “semantic store”. The access/
degraded store account makes no reference to control demands,
and treats retrieval as a process that operates in the same way
regardless of the control demands. The CSC framework thus pro-
vides a somewhat different perspective on the function and op-
eration of the fronto-temporoparietal systems that are damaged in
SA. We view the framework as addressing many of the same issues
highlighted within the access/storage tradition, but with reference
to neuro-cognitive processing mechanisms similar to those that
operate in more contemporary accounts of cognitive control and
semantic memory.
4.3. Loss of concepts versus loss of associates
A third recent proposal is that, whereas anterior temporal re-
gions (damaged in SD) encode conceptual representations of
word/object meanings, inferoparietal regions (sometimes da-
maged in SA) encode information about thematic relationships
amongst familiar items—for instance, knowledge about the re-
lationships between dogs and bones, or between soup and spoons.
This view is consistent with a recent large lesion–symptom cor-
relation study which found that generation of associative para-
phasias correlated with infero-parietal damage, while generation
of coordinate semantic or level errors correlated with superior
anterior temporal damage (Schwartz et al., 2011). It is also con-
sistent with some observations from SA in the current and pre-
vious studies: whereas associative errors in naming are virtually
nonexistent in SD they are not uncommon in SA (Jefferies and
Lambon Ralph, 2006), and the “semantic drift” phenomenon ob-
served in verbal fluency may arise when such patients are “lured”
by associates of a previously-produced response.
We find the link between inferoparietal lesions and associative
errors to be compelling and worthy of further study. We also view
these data as potentially consistent with the current proposal.
Disordered control involves difficulty in inhibiting competitors
that spring to mind, and depending upon the task, such compe-
titors may include associates of a stimulus as well as its semantic
neighbors. The increased production of associates for naming and
fluency tasks in SA might therefore reflect loss of semantic control.
In contrast, the lack of associative errors in SD would result from
conceptual degradation, which makes it hard for patients to gen-
erate item-specific features or associates. In this situation, gen-
eration of associative paraphasias is very unlikely.
The hypothesis that inferoparietal regions are specifically
dedicated to knowledge of associative/thematic relationships is
more difficult to reconcile with a range of neuropsychological and
neuroimaging data, including the current results. First, both SD
and SA patients are impaired on tasks that directly probe asso-
ciative semantic knowledge (Jefferies and Lambon Ralph, 2006)
and, indeed, when the two types of information have been directly
compared on the same items, SD patients (who have no parietal
atrophy) tend to be worse on associative than categorical re-
lationships (Hoffman et al., 2013). Second, a recent fMRI study
designed to contrast these two forms of semantic information
found that the same semantic network was equivalently activated
and argued that these and other types of semantic knowledge may
be coded within a single hub-and-spoke framework (Jackson et al.,
in press). Third, although SA patients produce associative errors in
naming, the predominant errors of commission were semantic and
level errors. Fourth, the SA group was seriously impaired espe-
cially in more specific conditions of the sorting and word–picture
matching tasks, in which good performance relies on knowledge
of conceptual structure. It is difficult to see how this overall im-
pairment, as well as the observed sensitivity to typicality, famil-
iarity, and specificity, might arise solely from loss of associative
knowledge. Finally, some patients with SA have lesions restricted
to the frontal lobes, completely sparing infero-parietal cortex, yet
these patients show the same pattern of impaired behavior across
tasks (see Jackson et al., in press, for further details).
In summary, this brief overview establishes that the CSC fra-
mework is related to but distinct from other proposals about the
cognitive and neural processes that support semantic cognition.
4.4. Open questions and future directions
We believe that, in considering the role of control processes in
semantic task performance, the CSC framework provides a parti-
cularly useful way of conceptualizing the different causes of se-
mantic dysfunction in these two patient groups. What then are the
framework's limitations?
The chief limitation is that it does not specify, in any me-
chanistic detail, how systems of control and representation inter-
act. As a consequence it is challenging to understand how the
effects of representational distortion and disordered control will
jointly operate in anything but a qualitative sense. In this paper we
have outlined three factors known to influence recruitment of
control generally, and attempted to explain how these are also
likely to influence recruitment of control in particular semantic
tasks. We believe that this establishes the face validity of the ap-
proach, but it is not always clear exactly which control demands
come into play for which items in which tasks, whether and how
different control factors will summate or interact, and so on.
These limitations could be addressed by the development
of a more explicit computational model that would allow for
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simulation of the different varieties of damage (a non-trivial and
challenging enterprise to undertake). Influential models consistent
with the CSC framework have been described for the semantic
network itself (Rogers and McClelland, 2004; Dilkina et al., 2008)
and for control processes writ large (Botvinick and Cohen, 2014).
What remains is to assess whether models in this tradition can
help to explain and predict, in more mechanistic detail, differences
between patient groups of the kind we have documented here.
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